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Abstract. Distance-bounding is a practical solution aiming to prevent relay at-
tacks. The main challenge when designing such protocols is maintaining their
inexpensive cryptographic nature, whilst being able to protect against as many,
if not all, of the classical threats posed in their context. Moreover, in distance-
bounding, some subtle security shortcomings related to the PRF (pseudorandom
function) assumption and ingenious attack techniques based on observing verifiers’
outputs have recently been put forward. Also, the recent terrorist-fraud by Hancke
somehow recalls once more the need to account for noisy communications in the
security analysis of distance-bounding. In this paper, we attempt to incorporate
the lessons taught by these new developments in our distance-bounding protocol
design. The result is a new class of protocols, with increasing levels of security,
accommodating the latest advances3; at the same time, we preserve the lightweight
nature of the design throughout the whole class.
1 Introduction
In [9], Brands and Chaum introduced the notion of distance-bounding (DB) protocols.
The aim is to have a prover demonstrate his proximity to a verifier, and authenticate
himself to this verifier. The proof of proximity can be an efficient deterrent against relay
attacks [15]. DB protocols [23,25,34,37] generally consist of an initialisation phase
(where the parties establish some short-term secret) and a distance-bounding phase. This
latter phase is time-critical. It imposes very fast computation, typically of less than a
single clock cycle per round, and the verifier measures the time-of-flight of the messages
exchanged. This is how the verifier ascertains a distance-bound between him and the
prover.
In the literature covering such protocols, the threat-model comprises three well-
established types of attacks. The first is distance-fraud (DF), in which a prover tries to
convince the verifier that he is closer than he really is. In the second type, mafia-fraud
(MF), an adversary communicates with both a prover and a verifier which are far apart,
and the adversary tries to convince the verifier that the prover would be close enough
to be granted privileges. Finally, in a terrorist-fraud (TF), an adversary is getting the
3 An earlier version of this line of work was presented in [7]. Also, some preliminaries and
adjacent topics made the subject of an invited talk [8].
necessary and sufficient help from a coerced, far-away prover in order to pass the protocol
only during this corrupted run, but not in a later, coercion-free session. Generalisations of
these frauds have also been described. In [13], Cremers et al. describe distance-hijacking
as a mixture between distance-fraud and terrorist-fraud: one dishonest, far-away prover
exploits several honest provers to gain privileges. Impersonation-fraud is presented
in [16]; as its name suggests, one dishonest prover tries to impersonate an honest one.
The first DB protocols were not secure against terrorist-fraud [9,21,29,35]. Then,
to name but a few, Bussard and Bagga [10], Hancke and Kuhn [21], Munilla and
Peinado [29], Kim and Avoine [24], Reid et al. [34] proposed schemes addressing
terrorist-fraud protection or mafia-fraud protection, or a better suitability to practice,
etc. For instance, in [3], the TDB protocol by Avoine et al. addresses specifically the
protection against terrorist-fraud, using threshold secret sharing schemes. Nonetheless,
many attacks [1,27,28,31,30] onto DB protocols [25,35,37,33] continue to be published.
To this end, Kim et al. stated [24] that there is no DB protocol, which can resist well
against all three classical frauds and has only one-bit challenges/responses per iteration
in the distance-bounding phase.
Recently, the first attempts to formalise DB have emerged. In [2], Avoine et al. give
a semi-formal model for distance-bounding. Dürholz et al. [17] follow, with a more
precise formalisation in which the expression TF appears possibly too strong (i.e., many
protocols that are intuitively TF-resistant are shown insecure against TF in this model).
At the same time, [6,4] expose some essential shortcomings of the DB design and of the
security claims related to it (i.e., [6] exposes building blocks for DB, like pseudorandom
functions (PRFs), that lead to DF and generalised MF attacks; [4] shows that public-key
mechanisms may fail to provide TF).
In this paper, we attempt to take notice of all these recent developments: e.g., we
strengthen the way PRFs are used in DB, we reinforce and take forward the manner in
which secret sharing schemes can be employed to build TF-resistant DB protocols and,
finally, we attempt to combine it all harmoniously in such a way that we obtain robust,
yet lightweight DB.
2 Summary of DB Security: Status & Results
At this early stage, in Table 1 below, we present the security status of several, existing
DB protocols, and announce that of two of our DB protocols to be presented herein.
Namely, please notice our SKIpro and SKIlite protocols and their security guarantees by
comparison to the other DB protocols in this table.
In this table, we assumed channels that are not noisy, though further in this paper we
extend the analysis on our protocols to the case of noisy channels as well. Let us briefly
explain some details from the table. Let n be the number of DB rounds, and ν< n. Let t
be the number of possible values for a challenge, i.e., classically t = 2. In the case of
terrorist-fraud, we supposed along standard lines two facts: 1. for n−ν DB rounds, the
adversary has got all responses, irrespective of the value of challenges; 2. for the other
ν DB rounds, for each such round, the adversary knows the answers for t−1 (out of t)
values possible for a challenge.
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Table 1. Probability of success of the best (known) attacks onto DB
Protocol Success Probability
Key-Length Distance-Fraud Mafia-fraud Terrorist-Fraud MIM
Brands & Chaum [9] n (1/2)n cnf [19] (1/2)n cnf [25] 1 cnf [25] (1/2)n
Bussard & Bagga [11] n 1 cnf [4] (1/2)n 1 cnf [4] (1/2)n
Cˇapkun et al. (SECTOR) [12] n (1/2)n cnf [19] (1/2)n cnf [25] 1 cnf [25] (1/2)n
Hancke & Kuhn [21] n (3/4)n cnf [19] (3/4)n cnf [25] 1 cnf [25] (3/4)n
Reid et al. [34] n (3/4)n cnf [19] (3/4)n cnf [26] (3/4)ν cnf [25] (3/4)n or 1 cnf [4]
Singelée & Preneel [35] n (1/2)n cnf [19] (1/2)n cnf [25] 1 cnf [25] (1/2)n
Tu & Piramuthu [37] n (3/4)n cnf [30] (9/16)n cnf [30] (3/4)ν cnf [30] 1 cnf [25]
Munilla & Peinado [29] n (3/4)n cnf [19] (3/5)n cnf [19] 1 cnf [19] (3/5)n
Swiss-Knife [25] n (3/4)n cnf [25] (1/2)n cnf [25] (3/4)ν cnf [25] (1/2)n
Kim & Avoine [24] n (7/8)n cnf [19] (1/2)n cnf [19] 1 cnf [19] (1/2)n
Nikov & Vauclair [32] * k¯ 1/k cnf [25] (1/2)n cnf [25] 1 cnf [25] (1/2)n
Avoine et al. [3] n (3/4)n (2/3)n (2/3)ν (2/3)n
SKIpro ` (3/4)n (2/3)n (2/3)ν (2/3)n
SKIlite ` (3/4)n (3/4)n 1 (3/4)n
* In this case, k¯ and k are additional parameters; this protocol requires heavy computations. The parameter ν is
explained in the paragraph above.
From the table, we can already notice some similarities between the protocol in [21],
by Hancke and Kuhn, and the simplest version of the SKI protocols to be introduced
herein, namely SKIlite . Also, we can see a certain closeness between the Avoine et al.
protocol [3] and a stronger version of our protocols, i.e., SKIpro . In that sense, what
this line of work brings as a novelty is a more precise design of the protocols (i.e., there
are design differences between the SKI protocols and its similar counterparts in the
table). Our design is driven by very recent exhibited DB attack-techniques and classical
frauds [20,4,6]. We also propose a more in-depth security analysis due to the same recent
threats and a more attentive look into the DB security in noisy communications4.
As the reader will see in our design choices presented in Section 5.3 and in the attacks
we present in Section 5, we get our attack bounds (as per Table 1) by enforcing certain
requirements on our DB building blocks. We hereby mention some of these enforcements:
1. the use of the PRF instance in the initialisation phase is masked, i.e., we use fx(·)⊕M
for a randomly looking M, instead of just employing fx(·); 2. the DB response-function
is such that it uses the secret x in a way that it does not conflict with x keying fx(·) in
the initialisation phase; 3. a linear transformation is chosen at the initialisation phase
to be applied on the secret x, before we use x in the response-function. These are the
sort of design-amendments imposed by the recent, aforementioned attacks [20,4,6]. In
fact, the very new attack-technique in [20] is not taken into account in Table 1. With our
SKIpro protocol, we resist the TF by Hancke.
Structure. The rest of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 3, we reiterate what
are the settings in which DB communications are taking place. In Section 4, we express
the DB security requirements in these communication settings; to do so, we follow the
well-established understandings of the classical frauds in the existing literature, and we
also offer some generalisations. In Section 5, we introduce our protocol-schema, called
SKI, explain most of its design, and present two instantiations of it, i.e., SKIpro and
4 E.g., a recent attack-technique [20] by Hancke, described on page 10, reiterates the importance
of considering noise in DB, bit-based computations.
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SKIlite . We then argue that these protocols protect against the frauds as they were
described in Section 4. In Section 6, we conclude. In an appendix, we present other
instantiations of our protocol schema (i.e., SKIshamir and SKI4 ), varying in their security
strength, but all remaining lightweight.
3 DB Communication
In what follows, we present the main, very straightforward guidelines of the settings
in which DB protocols are considered to run. (The underlying communication and the
threat model could actually be properly formalised, e.g., as an interactive system [18].
This is not our purpose herein, and it will be left for an extended version of this paper.)
DB protocols are run in natural communication settings :
– there is a generally accepted notion of time, e.g., there is a time-unit;
– a notion of measurable/quantifiable location and distance;
– the timed communication obeys the laws of physics.
All participants (provers, verifiers, adversaries) comply to the following:
– have the correct means/algorithms to run their part (e.g., an RFID tag, a reader, both,
etc.);
– are fixed at some location;
– send messages with a destination through a broadcast, non-authenticated, asyn-
chronous channel.
Furthermore, honest participants read messages that are intended for them, when
these messages reach them. An attacker can change the destination of a message, aiming
it to himself and can create his own messages and inject them into the communication.
In the distance-bounding phase, the noise of the channel cannot be corrected by honest
parties (i.e., the adversary may have extra technology to do so, but the honest parties
cannot do so within the limits of time imposed).
NOTE: It is clear in this model that an adversary can do very limited man-in-the-
middle attacks. If a verifier sends a message and expects a fast response back, this deters
a man-in-the-middle (MiM) adversary to send the message further to a prover and await
for the prover’s response to convey to the verifier, i.e., as such responses would arrive to
the verifier too late. In the same way, an adversary can get very limited, online help even
from a coerced, but far-away prover.
4 DB: Protocols & Requirements
In line with the previous section, we present these requirements using natural language.
(As before, it is worth mentioning that in a formal model for DB, these could be expressed,
e.g., in the style of completeness/soundness requirements on interactive systems [18],
with thresholds on the success/failure probabilities of different events or sequences of
events. This is left for an extended version of this paper tackling formalisation and
provable security aspects.)
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4.1 Distance-Bounding Protocols
In general, let the provers be denoted by P and the verifiers by V . Let A denote the
adversary and P∗ designate dishonest provers. We assume that verifiers end the DB
protocols by outputting one bit b denoting acceptance, i.e. b = 1, or rejection, i.e., b = 0.
(I.e., this is in line with practice, where a LED turning green or red on an access point
denotes granted or denied access, respectively). In the generalised MF presented in [4],
it is this sort of return channel that facilitates the attacks (i.e., logically, intruders learn
more information by looking also at whether the run was successful or not.). We proceed
with the definition of a DB protocol.
Definition 1. Distance-Bounding Protocols. A distance-bounding (DB) protocol is
defined by an acceptable distance-bound, a prover P and a verifier V , each running
probabilistic, efficient5 algorithms, both sharing a long-term key x such that the following
happens:
– the verifier’s algorithm efficiently terminates on any interaction6;
– if the prover P is within the acceptable distance-bound from the verifier V , then the
verifier V terminates successfully (almost always7).
DB can take place in concurrent settings as well, i.e., there are several provers and
several verifiers, sharing secrets in a pairwise manner, all running the same DB protocol
in parallel. We can also think of the scenario where one prover and one verifier run the
same protocol several times, in a sequential fashion. In the description of the security
requirements to follow, we will also consider such multi-party extensions of the definition
above.
4.2 Distance-Bounding Requirements
Let α,β,γ,γ′ ∈ [0,1] be some variables (depending on some parameters, e.g., on the
number of rounds in the distance-bounding phase), or let α,β,γ,γ′ ∈ [0,1] be some fixed
constants (e.g., pre-established security-tolerance limits). The security requirements of
DB protocols are described below, and they depend on the values of these α,β,γ,γ′.
Definition 2. α-resistance to distance-fraud: We say that a DB protocol is α-resistant
to distance-fraud if any far-away, dishonest prover P∗ which is running the protocol with
a verifier V , on their shared secret, cannot make the verifier accept (i.e., output 1) with a
probability greater than α (taken over the random choices made by V ).
5 In theory, “efficient” denotes polynomial in some security parameters. In practice, one should
be able to see clearly that these algorithms are computationally inexpensive.
6 Even if the prover is dishonest, after a finite number of steps, a reader either accepts or rejects.
7 In theory, “almost always” would entail some overwhelming probability in a security parameter.
In practice, it means that there are some exceptional circumstances where the verifier would
reject correct transcripts. I.e., in extremely noisy channels (which occur very rarely) the verifier
would be bound to reject messages that originated correctly from the prover.
5
As we said before, depending on the security desired, one may take α to be negligible
in a security parameter (e.g., cΘ(n), where c is a constant in (0,1) and n is the number of
rounds and/or the key-length) or, simply a fixed value in (0,1).
If we consider a multi-party setting (e.g., taking several runs, with far-away and
close-by provers), then the DF-resistance as defined above captures the notion of distance
hijacking in [13], i.e., an experiment in which a dishonest far-away prover P∗ may use
several other provers to get authenticated as if he was close to the verifier. The DF-
resistance we assess in Section 5.5 can be extended to account for such a multi-party
setting.
We move now to the resistance to mafia-fraud.
Definition 3. β-resistance to MF: We say that a DB protocol is β-resistant to mafia-
fraud if an adversary A interfering up to his powers within the interaction between a
far-away, honest prover P and verifier V on their shared secret cannot make the verifier
accept (i.e., output 1) with a probability greater than β (taken over the random choices
made by P,V and A ).
Of course, this definition of MF-resistance can be cast in a multi-party setting as well
and it can also be generalised to a stronger MiM attack. For instance, in a multi-party
setting, we consider that during a learning phase, the attacker A interacts, in parallel,
with several provers and several verifiers and then —in an attack phase— A tries to win
in a run in front of a verifier, which is far-away from several provers. (In a practical
setting, it is as if an attacker would have cloned several tags and would make them
interact with several readers with which they are registered. From such a multi-party
communication, he can get potentially more benefits, faster.) In our security assessment
in Section 5.5, the arguments can be easily extended to such a concurrent setting.
Definition 4. (γ,γ′)-resistance to TF: We say that a DB protocol is (γ,γ′)-resistant to
terrorist-fraud if for any far-away, coerced prover P∗, it is the case that, below, (1)
implies (2)
— (1). an adversary A interfering up to his powers with an interaction between P∗ and
verifier V on their shared secret, where this interaction is successful with probability at
least γ (over the random choices of V and A ),
— (2). A can later succeed on his own to make the verifier accept in a new protocol run
with a probability greater than γ′ (taken over the new random choices made by V and
A ).
This definition of TF-resistance can also be presented in a multi-party setting and
generalised to a stronger threat. For instance, one first thing to imagine is a coercion-
phase followed by a multi-party MF, i.e., a MiM phase as we mentioned after Definition 3.
In fact, our assessment of TF-resistance made in Section 5.5 can be extended easily to
such an enhanced threat.
5 The SKI Distance-Bounding Protocols
In the first part of this section, we present our protocols. In the second, we explain
our design. In the third, we assess their resistance to frauds, upon the definitions and
discussions in Section 3 and Section 4.
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5.1 Protocols’ Descriptions
We now propose a schema of DB protocols denoted SKI and presented in Figure 1, i.e.,
we use “schema” to denote that, at this stage, we leave under-determined the choice
of the exact primitives to be used inside. Later in the section, by suggesting different
instantiations of these primitives, we obtain a class of DB protocols, with varying levels
of resistance to DB attacks. Nonetheless, from the weakest to the strongest of them,
these protocols are lightweight.
Verifier V Prover P
x x ∈U GF(q)` x
Initialisation phase
NP←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Generate a nonce NP ∈ {0,1}k
Choose a transformation
L ∈ L with x′ := L(x) and x′ ∈ GF(q)n,
generate a ∈ GF(q)t ′·n
and a nonce NV ∈ {0,1}k.
Do M := a⊕ fx(NP,NV ,L).
M,L,NV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Do x′ := L(x), x′ ∈ GF(q)n.
Do a := M⊕ fx(NP,NV ,L).
Distance-bounding phase
for i = 1 to n
Generate ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}.
Start Clock ci−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ if ci /∈ {1, . . . , t}, halt
Stop Clock ri←−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−− Do ri := F(ci,ai,x′i).
Verify at least τ responses ri are correct and that their round i took at most 2B.
OutV−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−−→
Fig. 1. The SKI schema of Distance-Bounding Protocols
Let s be a security parameter. The secret key x is a vector of ` elements over GF(q),
with ` ∈Ω(s), with q a constant giving the power of prime so that we work over GF(q),
the finite field with q elements. In some of the concrete examples to follow, we employ
q = 2, i.e., we work over bits8. The SKI protocols are built using a PRF, denoted
( fx)x∈GF(q)` .
The prover selects a nonce NP of k bits and sends it over to the verifier, for k ∈Ω(s).
The verifier V first selects a nonce NV also of k bits. Then, he picks a random linear
transformation L from a set L , set that is specified by the SKI protocol instance (as we
8 Irrespective of working over bits or not, we consider that the practicality of today’s cheap
RFID/NFC cards goes anyway beyond one-bit responses [36]. Moreover, pre-computation
tables can be used to render online computation very efficient.
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will concretely see later). The parties compute x′ = L(x). We consider that the vector x′
obtained out of x through L has length n, with n ∈Ω(s).
The distance-bounding phase will have n rounds with challenges taking t possible
values, for a constant t. Another constant we use is t ′. To give an anticipative intuition,
t ′ is such that t ′ ≤ t In our main proposal, we use t = 3 and t ′ = 2, i.e., we keep the
lightweight character.
The verifier finally picks a masking-vector M with M ∈ GF(q)t ′·n. Further, the
element a = (a1, . . . ,an) is established by V and it is sent encrypted into M as follows:
M = a⊕ fx(NP,NV ,L), with M ∈GF(q)t ′·n. (As we can see, SKI employs fx(NP,NV ,L)
as illustrated, with fx(NP,NV ,L) ∈ GF(q)t ′·n.)
So, c = (c1, . . . ,cn) is the challenge-vector with ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, ri := F(ci,ai,x′i)
is the i-th response to the i-th challenge ci, with i ∈ {1, . . . ,n}, ri ∈ GF(q) and F as
specified below. In our concrete proposals, we use t = 3, or t = 2 for the lighter version.
By B, we denote the maximal accepted time-of-flight of one challenge/response
between P and V . Assume that messages travel uniformly with a speed of one space-
unit/time-unit. Then, as usual, B is also the distance-bound acceptable between P and V .
The protocol ends with a message OutV denoting the output of the verifier (i.e., the
success/failure of the protocol). We tolerate communication noise. Thus, a successful
run is that where at least τ out of n DB responses are correct and have been delivered
within the time-bound B. Later in the paper, it will be implied what bound on τ we need
(in function of n and the probability of the communication noise) such that legitimate
runs are not overruled, yet malicious runs are not validated.
As we anticipated already, all the variables and functions in SKI will be instantiated
with small values and lightweight mathematical objects.
NOTE: To address noisy time-critical communications, we introduce the probability
pnoise of one response being erroneous (à la [21]). The probability that at least τ responses
out of n are of the correct kind is clearly given by:
B(n,τ,1− pnoise) =
n
∑
i=τ
(n
i
)
(1− pnoise)i pn−inoise
It is natural to choose τ (and other parameters) such that we operate with correct DB
protocols, cnf. with Definition 1. I.e., the protocol is complete: honest communications
succeed with high probability. Let us assess this. So, let ε> 0. If we force τ such that
τ≤ (1− pnoise−ε)n, then it implies B(n,τ,1− pnoise)≥ 1−e−2ε2n (due to the Hoeffding
bound [22]), i.e., it implies the verifier accepting honest communications with a very
good probability as n grows. Also, in practice, we may use a constant pnoise (i.e., hard-
coded in the protocol implementation). This also entails employing τ as some parameter
which is linear in terms of n (in order to have negligible probabilities of failure in honest
executions).
A detailed analysis on optimising the selection of τ is provided in [14].
5.2 Towards Specific Building Blocks
We now continue with the instantiations of some of objects in our SKI schema. Our
choices of them will be explained shortly.
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The response-function F. In the main body of the paper, we consider one generic such
response-function F in which the i-th response (1≤ i≤ n) is produced as follows:
Fxor(ci,ai,x′i) = x
′
i1ci=t +(ai)11ci∈{t,1}+ . . .+(ai)t ′1ci∈{t,t ′}
where ci ∈ {1, . . . , t}, x′i ∈ GF(q), q≥ 2, (ai) j ∈ GF(q), j ∈ {1, . . . , t ′}, and 1R is 1 if R
is true and 0 otherwise.
In the appendix, we will present other possibilities for the response-function F .
The set of transformations L . We can consider several sets L of transformations to be
used in the PRF-instance of SKI’s initialisation phase. (Such a set is formally referred to
as a leakage scheme and it is thuswise defined in [5].)
We consider Lbit consisting of all Lµ transforms, where Lµ is defined using a vector
µ ∈ GF(q)` by
Lµ(x) = (µ · x, . . . ,µ · x)
I.e., all coordinates of the vector Lµ(x) are set to the scalar product between µ and x.
We could consider other suitable9 instances of L , but this may entail a number of DB
rounds greater than n (because of the noise involved). Or, if no noise is to be considered,
we could employ L = Lclassic, i.e., the set containing a single function L which is the
identity function. For the purpose of this paper (i.e., lightweight DB protocols), we
restrict ourselves to using Lbit as per the above. Also, if we do not view TF-resistance,
then we can leave the L set empty.
5.3 SKI: Design Choices
Using a mask M. We chose to use a mask M, indirectly decided by V , due to the fact
that just using fx(. . . ,NP, . . .) to calculate a can lead to DF attacks [6]. To mount such an
attack, a corrupt P∗ basically chooses a trapdoor NP to bias the output distribution of
fx(. . . ,NP, . . .). By using the mask M, we prevent such a P∗ from reaching his goal.
The PRF f & the Response-Function F. Already note the Fxor is in fact carrying on
from the TDB protocol [3], i.e., using secret-sharing ideas to protect against TF. Also, it
preserves the lightweight trend.
Moreover, in SKI, the chosen f and F have to meet the following requirement. They
are such that it is indistinguishable when Lµ is applied to the secret key x and when it
is applied to another randomly selected x¯ ∈ GF(q)`, even if we are given access to the
other messages in the protocol, i.e., NP,NV and some results related to fx(Np,NV ,L) and
L(x¯) as per the protocol, or even if we choose them adaptively as an adversary may do.
This security-enforcement also has an impact on an additional property of the PRF f
(i.e., on how its keys are used outside its calls). This design choice is motivated by the
attacks in [6], where a trapdoor choice of NP or NV together with x being used in Lµ
could lead generalised MF attacks.
The F-functions that we take (see the previous section) enjoy other properties that
help attain security in front of DB frauds. E.g., similarly to [3], the F-functions are such
9 “Suitable” denotes here compliant with deterring the TF in [20].
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that knowing the complete table of the response-function F for a given ci leaks x′i, yet
knowing only up to t ′ entries challenge-response in this table discloses no information
about x′i. Please refer to [5] for details.
The Set L of Transforms. The idea of the set L is that, when leaking some noisy versions
of L(x) for some chosen L ∈ L , the adversary can reconstruct x without noise.
We introduced this transformation in order to protect against a TF observed by
Hancke [20]. In this attack, a malicious prover could select a noise-vector e of Hamming
weight n− τ and provide a slightly modified, but full table of all ci 7→ F(ci,ai,xi)
functions. The modification in the table is as follows: if ei = 1, then the output of
F(v,ai,xi) is flipped, where v ∈ {1, . . . , t} is one, randomly chosen value of the possible
values for the i-th challenge ci. Assuming that the adversary has a powerful device which
can answer to V without noise, then this adversary passes with probability γ= 1. Then,
an adversary –out of this full table– can reconstruct x+ e. Then, x cannot be recovered
efficiently by the adversary (whilst P∗ substantially helped the adversary towards passing
the protocol).
Recall that –in our protocols– the “master-secret” that f is applied upon for one value
of ci is not necessarily the shared key x, but instead it is x′ with x′ = L(x), where L is the
transformation chosen by V in the initialisation phase of the protocol and discussed above.
As we said, this offers better protection against new types of threats: by introducing L(x)
instead of x inside F , then in Hancke’s attack, the adversary can get to learn L(x)+ e.
Imagine now a dishonest prover as above choosing a noise-vector e of Hamming
weight (at most) t, with e possibly depending on x and a transformation L chosen in
the current run initialisation phase. If Lbit is used as in our protocols, then in n rounds
of the attack as per the above, an attacker A deduces µ · x, for all obtained µ in the
round-transformations L = Lµ(L ∈ Lbit ). The attacker does so by computing the majority
of the vector x′ that he learns10 out of the responses. These values µ · x can be correct
with a high probability, if t = HW (e) is not too close to n, i.e., t is at least less than n2 .
(HW denotes the Hamming weight.) Then, A can solve a linear system to get x. Hence,
leaking x makes this attack not a valid terrorist-fraud (since the dishonest prover helped
A pass the protocol, but he also leaked x to this attacker). I.e., our protocol instance with
Lbit resists the attack by Hancke [20].
5.4 The Main Instances of SKI
We now propose the most interesting instances of SKI: the first one protecting against
all threats presented in Section 3 (and rendering the TF scenario by Hancke [20] hard to
mount for some parameters, if not infeasible), and a second one, much more lightweight,
not offering TF-resistance, but only DF- and MF-resistance. Of course, the spectrum of
the class SKI is much larger, and we will touch upon that in our appendix.
– SKIpro : defined by the response-function Fxor above, with q = 2, t = 3, t ′ = 2,
i.e., F(ci,ai,x′i) = (ai)ci for ci ∈ {1,2} and F(3,ai,x′i) = x′i + (ai)1 + (ai)2, with
(ai)1,(ai)2,xi ∈ GF(2), and L = Lbit;
10 We presume that if you know the full table of the response for a given ci, then this leaks x′. Our
F functions are like that.
10
– SKIlite : defined by a variant of response-function Fxor above (not depending on x′i),
with q = 2, t = t ′ = 2, i.e., F(ci,ai,x′i) = (ai)ci for ci ∈ {1,2}, with (ai)1,(ai)2 ∈
GF(2), and L = /0. (In SKIlite , L = /0 since in the response-function F there is no
x′ used, as TF-resistance is not envisaged by this instance.)
Note, once more, that both protocols are very inexpensive computationally.
5.5 Security Analysis
In this section, we simply describe the best-known attack strategies for mounting DB
frauds onto SKI. We report the security analysis for SKIpro, made in a symbolic form
(i.e, on variables t, q, on the function F , etc). The analysis for SKIlite is omitted, as it
follows exactly the same principles (where eventually just the numerical values for t, q,
or the expression of F would change). In an extended version of this work [5], we will
give the formal proofs showing that these attacks are indeed the best attainable attacks
against SKI, i.e., their probabilities of success can be shown to be the actual provable
security bounds.
DF-resistance for SKIpro . Intuitively, to defeat DF-resistance, the dishonest, far-away
prover P∗ has to anticipate the challenge before it reaches him, to compute the response-
function F with the challenge as one of the arguments, and to do so as early as possible.
Then, he needs to send the resulting response pre-emptively. So, in real terms, this P∗
is computing the preimage of a map ci 7→ F(ci,ai,x′i) and he gets more successful at
mounting this fraud as this computable preimage gets larger. (Note that the size of this
computable preimage depends on some random choice, i.e., on the value selected for ai).
We recall that our response-function for SKIpro , taken on the i-th DB round, is as
follows: F(ci,ai,x′i) = (ai)ci for ci ∈ {1,2} and F(3,ai,x′i) = x′i+(ai)1+(ai)2. (Let us
assume a fixed transformation L that gives x′: e.g., as for SKIpro , one Lµ chosen in such
a protocol round; this does not affect the rest).
So, the best case for P∗ to invert ci 7→ F(ci,ai,x′i), i.e., to get the right answer on
an “anticipated” challenge, is when (ai)1 = (ai)2 = xi. In this case, he would know the
answer, no matter which of the 3 values ci actually takes, i.e., the preimage of the map
ci 7→ F(ci,ai,x′i) has size 3. Over the choice of ai, this would happen with probability
1
4 . If you look further at the response-function, you will note that it is impossible to
invert the map onto one specific value of ci, i.e., to make the aforementioned preimage
have size 1. As the preimage can only have size 1, 2 or 3, then the prover narrowing his
correct answers over a space of 2 values for the challenges can happen with probability
1− 14 .
So, the expected value of the size of this pre-image over the choices of ai (i.e., the
expected number of values for the challenge ci that the prover could anticipate the answer
for) is (2× 34 +3× 14 ) = 94 .
Remember that in SKIpro , in total, we have t = 3 values for any challenge. So, given
x′ fixed, each iteration has a probability to succeed equal of 94 × 13 = 34 .
We note that there is no other mechanism that this prover P∗ could pull through.
For instance, since it is the verifier who chooses a and M, the distribution of the ai’s is
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uniform, i.e., not influenced by a possible trapdoor choice of NP from P∗. (This excludes
the DF attacks in [6].)
So, we have just given the description of the best (mathematical) strategy of P∗ to
mount a DF, which passes with a probability of ( 34 )
n, if no noise is considered. (This is
as reported on our initial table, Table 1, on page 3.).
If, in turn, we do consider noise, then the overall success probability is going to
be B(n,τ, 34 ) = ∑
n
i=τ
( n
i
)
( 34 )
i( 14 )
n−i. Then, for τ> ( 34 + ε)n, we have B(n,τ,
3
4 ) less than
e−2ε2n, for some ε> 0 (by the Hoeffding bound [22]).
uunionsq
MF-resistance for SKIpro . Assume a mafia-fraud attacker A taking part, up to his
capabilities, in an interaction between P and V .
Assuming that the attacker does not learn anything conclusive during the initialisation
phase (about x or how to respond in the DB phase)11, the probability of him succeeding
in this fraud rests only on giving (by chance) the correct answers to the challenges sent
by V (before P does so); I.e., the probability of A of succeeding in this MF is given by
p = ∏
1≤i≤n
Pr
ci∈{1,...,t}
[ri being correct for ci|ci is sent by V ].
Getting ri correct for ci can be attained in two distinct ways: 1. in the event e1 of guessing
c′i = ci and sending it beforehand to such a Pj and getting the correct response ri, or 2. in
the event e2 of simply guessing the correct answer ri (for a challenge c′i 6= ci).
So the probability of success in one round is Pr[e1]+Pr[e2] = 1t +
t−1
t × 1q . In SKIpro ,
t = 3 and q = 2, so we get a concrete, overall p of ( 23 )
n, if no noise is considered within
the communications. (This is as reported on our initial table, Table 1, on page 3.).
If we consider the noise of the channels, then we get p = B(n,τ,Pr[e1]+Pr[e2]) =
B(n,τ, 23 ). Then, for τ > (
2
3 + ε)n, we have B(n,τ,
2
3 ) less than e
−2ε2n, for some ε > 0
(by the Hoeffding bound [22]).
uunionsq
11 In fact, we can argue that this is the case in the SKI protocols. With high probability, there is
no collision between the nonces NP and NV (if the space of the nonces is large enough, e.g.,
2Ω(n)). So, the output of the PRF instance fx is not biased by the choices of these values. So,
A learns nothing from this. Also, in SKIpro , it is not x that is used in F directly, but L(x) is.
Moreover, as we stated in the description of the design, the chosen F for SKIpro is such that
it is indistinguishable when it is applied to the secret key x and when it is applied to another
randomly selected x′ ∈GF(q)`, even if we are given access to the other messages in the protocol,
i.e., NP,NV , or we choose them adaptively as A may do. (We leave the complete formalism and
proof of this for an extended version of this paper [5].) So, due to this indistinguishability, it is
as if the shared secret key x were not used outside the f -keying procedure. Given the above and
the standard PRF assumption, it means that A seeing the output of fx equates to him seeing
the output of a real-random function, i.e., for A , it is as if a were chosen at random. So, no
“good” strategy comes out from the observed protocol transcript. So, there is no better strategy
but what we say in the analysis above.
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TF-resistance for SKIpro . We split the discussion in two analyses: I. for noiseless
communication; II. for noisy communications.
I. Let us assume first that there are noiseless conditions.
As it is traditional in TF analysis, let us assume that the dishonest prover P∗ gives
away information to help A . Namely, suppose that: 1. for n−ν DB rounds, the adversary
has got all responses, irrespective of the value of challenges; 2. for the other ν DB rounds,
for each such round, the adversary knows the answers for t−1 (out of t) possible values
for a challenge. Then, his best chances to succeed is to get from V the challenges that he
knows how to answer to (in the ν “decisive” rounds), i.e., chances of ( t−1t )
ν.
(This translates in the case of noiseless conditions to the ( 23 )
ν bound, reported on
our initial table, Table 1, on page 3, for SKIpro .)
II. Let us assume now that the communications are noisy.
For concreteness, let us assume that the threshold of noise acceptance is τ out of n.
As per the strong, new attack by Hancke [20], assume that the dishonest prover
P∗ chose a noise bit-vector e with HW (e) = n2 . Further assume that e deterministically
depends on x and L, i.e., e = g(x,L) for some function g (i.e., P∗ does not choose e
adaptively based on the transformation L and on x). Then, assume that this P∗ leaked the
response table with noise e. I.e., for each i with ei = 0, P∗ leaked the full c 7→ F(c,ai,x′i)
table; for each i with ei = 1, P∗ leaked the table except that for some random c∗i , for
which the response-value F(c∗i ,ai,x′i) was flipped. Clearly, the leakage property12 of F
makes sure that A learns L and L(x)+ g(x,L). Due to the structure of L, the latter is
a vector of Hamming weight n2 . If g has some good property, this is indistinguishable
from L and L(x)+ g(y,L) for x and y independent. But g(y,L) perfectly randomizes
L(x). So, it does not help to give any information about x to A . Without knowing x, A
cannot predict any response in another session13 with new nonces (to compute the a
vector), so A has no advantage to succeed in the protocol. Therefore, for any strategy, γ′
is negligible.
Concretely, the probability that P∗ manages to help A succeed in the protocol during
the terrorist-fraud is the probability that at least τ rounds give a correct answer. Clearly,
the n2 rounds for which ei = 0 will be correct for sure. The others are correct with
probability t−1t . So, we have γ= B(
n
2 ,τ− n2 , t−1t ).
For τ− n2 > ( t−1t + ε)× n2 and some positive ε, we have γ is lower than e−2ε
2 n
2 (due
again to the Hoeffding bound [22]). That is, for the latter, we need τ> 56 n+ ε
n
2 (since
our t is 3). This simply comes down to taking τ slightly bigger than 56 n.
uunionsq
As we mentioned above, this analysis extends almost identically to SKIlite , i.e., up
12 This holds as we assume that the response-function F is such that knowing the complete table
of the response-function F for a given ci leaks x′i.
13 As we saw in the proof for the MIM attack, there is no other advantage that this attacker can
get on his own, in such runs.
13
to some changes in values. As we saw, the attack bounds are obtained provided that
the design-blocks inside SKI (i.e., the PRF f , the response-function F , their inter-play
within the rest of the design, the transformations L , etc.) meet some requirements (e.g.,
f and F are such that within the protocol-exchanges it does not show the fact that
F uses x inside, L contains linear transformations, M masks fx(. . .), etc.). All these
can be formalised further and then all these attack strategies can be transformed into
proofs of provable security bounds for the whole SKI class, i.e., all conditioned by and
parametrised in F , L , f , t, t ′, q, `, n, τ.
6 Conclusions
We note again the similar best-attack bounds stated in Table 1 for the protocol in [21], by
Hancke and Kuhn, and our simplest version of SKI, namely SKIlite . The Swiss-Knife
protocol [25] and the Avoine et al. [3] also seems to enjoy good security bounds for DF
and MF, but they do not protect against the new TF attack by Hancke [20].
Moreover, it was shown in [6] that the conditions on the underlying primitives need
to be strengthened for DF and generalised MF security to be indeed attained. This type
of attacks as in [6] can be bypassed in the SKI protocols. I.e., when the PRF instance is
used, it is masked with the randomly looking value M, computed on the right side of
the protocol avoiding the DF susceptibility shown in [6]. In our best MF description for
SKIpro , we explained the idea of choosing an f and an F that together with the protocol
transcript make F look as if it is not using x; in our further work, we will give the
formal details of how such a PRF f needs to come together with the response-function
F to attain formally the avoidance of the generalised MF exposed in [6]. We remind
that we also introduced a transform on x to be used inside the response-function F in
order to deter (if not avoid) the recent TF attacks by Hancke [20]. So, by all this and
beyond Table 1, we conclude that very compelling security—in accordance to the recent
developments in DB—is now provided by (at least one of) the SKI protocols.
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A Other Instances of SKI
In this section, we present two more instances of SKI: one with even stronger security
guarantees than what we have seen so far and another placing its assurances in between
SKIpro and SKIlite . For that, we first provide a new response-function.
Other instances of the response-function F. For the strongest version of SKI, we
recommend the following response function.
Fshamir(ci,ai,x′i) = x
′
i+(ai)1ci+(ai)2ci
2+ . . .+(ai)t−1cit−1
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where x′i ∈ GF(q), q ≥ 4, ci ∈ {1, . . . , t} is mapped to ci ∈ GF(q)∗ by an arbitrary
injective mapping, (ai) j ∈ GF(q), j ∈ {1, . . . , t−1};
It is obvious, given the expression of Fshamir (i.e., with x′ inside it) that it is meant
to protect against classical TF. If x′ = x, then it may not protect against the newest TF
scenario by Hancke [20].
Other instances of SKI. We present two more instances of SKI in descending order of
their security strength:
– SKIshamir : defined by the response-function Fshamir above, with q = 4, t = 3,
t ′ = 2, i.e., F(ci,ai,x′i) = x′i +(ai)1ci +(ai)2ci
2, with xi,(ai)1,(ai)2 ∈ GF(4) and
ci ∈ GF(4)∗; L = Lbit
– SKI4 : defined by the response-function Fxor above, with q = 2, t = 4, t ′ = 3, i.e.,
F(ci,ai,x′i) = (ai)ci for ci ∈ {1,2,3} and F(4,ai,xi) = x′i+(ai)1+(ai)2+(ai)3, with
(ai)1,(ai)2,(ai)3,xi ∈ GF(2); L = Lbit.
As we can see, SKIshamir is more secure even than SKIpro , with a response-function
F , based on Shamir’s secret-sharing scheme. In fact, recalling our DF-resistance analysis,
this response-function F is more powerful when it comes to inverting the map ci 7→
F(·,ai,xi). Hence, the DF-resistance of this instance is better than the one of SKIpro .
The opposite can be said about SKI4 , by comparison to SKIpro .
Security of these instances. Doing an analysis similar to the one we did for SKIpro in
Section 5.5, and we consider noisy conditions, we can state the following bounds for the
best mounted DF and MF attacks against these new instances:
SKIshamir SKI4
DF α= B(n,τ, 58 ) α= B(n,τ,
3
4 )
MF β= B(n,τ, 12 ) β= B(n,τ,
5
8 )
If, in turn, we do not consider noisy conditions then we get the following probabilities
for the best-known TF attacks against these instances of SKI:
SKIshamir SKI4
TF ( 23 )
ν ( 34 )
ν
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